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In response to pressures to be more “socially responsible,”
corporations are becoming more active in global
communities through direct involvement in social
initiatives. Critics, however, question the sincerity of these
activities and argue that firms are simply attempting
to stave off stakeholder pressures without providing a
corresponding benefit to society. By drawing on institutional
theory and resource dependence theory, we consider what
factors influence the adoption of a “meaningful” social
initiative—an initiative that is sustainable and has the
potential for a significant positive impact on society—
as opposed to a symbolic initiative. In addition, we raise
the question of how social initiatives—both meaningful
and symbolic—participate in the “institutional war” over
the meaning of corporate social responsibility.
T
 
he pressure on firms to be “socially responsible” continuously
increases and originates from a range of stakeholder groups,
including customers, communities, employees, governments,
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and shareholders (Sethi 2003a). Walsh and colleagues (2003: 875)
go so far as to state, “Attending to social welfare may soon match
economic performance as a condition for securing resources and
legitimacy.” Corporations have responded to this pressure in a
variety of ways. An important and evolving response is the adoption
of social initiatives designed to improve the well-being of the cor-
poration’s global communities. These social initiatives are well
beyond traditional philanthropic activities. Corporations are not
simply providing cash donations to nonprofit organizations but
are directly involved in, and provide significant resources to, their
community projects (Alperson 1996, 1998; Hess et al. 2002). The
nature of these initiatives reflects the growing outlook among
stakeholders that “people need help solving their problems, not just
money” (Hess et al. 2002: 113).
Social initiatives, however, are not without controversy. Corporate
critics question the sincerity of these activities and argue that firms
are simply attempting to stave off stakeholder pressures without
providing a corresponding benefit to society (Bakan 2004; Christian
Aid 2004; Green 2001; Lopatin 2004). By not making actual
changes to corporate operations, community projects allow firms to
continue “business as usual,” avoid new regulation, and hold off
demands for changes that would be more beneficial to society. This
is especially problematic if firms’ social initiatives in the community
have little real impact on social welfare.
Challenges by critics raise two different issues, one at the organi-
zational level and one at the societal level. At the organizational
level, firms that long used philanthropic activity as a way to improve
their reputations may be using community-based social initiatives
in a manner akin to “greenwashing” in environmental performance.
That is, the positive public relations coverage provided by social
initiatives deflects attention away from corporate practices that are
harmful to society. At the societal level, these initiatives play a role
in the debate over what it means for a corporation to be “socially
responsible” and therefore have “legitimacy.” Corporate social
initiatives shape this debate in favor of corporate interests by limiting
“social responsibility” to simply voluntary community activities,
and excluding greater (and mandatory) obligations to society (Shamir
2005).
A review of corporate social reports provides some anecdotal
evidence for both sets of issues. Social reports were envisioned as a
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way to increase corporate accountability through the provision of
information to stakeholders and by forcing firms to think more
deeply about their impact on society (through the “triple bottom
line”). In practice, however, some firms commonly use these reports
to divert attention away from issues of accountability and toward
their active, voluntary involvement in the community (see Adams
2002; Adams and Evans 2004). This use of social initiatives within
social reports may “greenwash” current operations, as well as
attempt to direct attention regarding social responsibility to a
limited set of issues. For a more specific example at the organization
level, consider the chocolate and candy manufacturer Cadbury
Schweppes. To demonstrate that they were responsive to the
problem of childhood obesity—a critical social issue facing their
industry—the company donated equipment to playgrounds. To
receive the equipment, however, children needed to buy chocolate
to get the necessary vouchers (Cadbury Schweppes 2006). Public
outcry forced the company to change its program, but the original
initiative seems to demonstrate a voluntary initiative with potentially
little net benefit to society, as the benefits provided by the equipment
were offset by the additional candy sold and the company not other-
wise changing its products or its marketing practices.
Although many firms active in community involvement initiatives
are providing significant benefits to society and are using their
initiatives as a foundation for infusing socially responsible behavior
throughout the organization, a significant number of others are
not. These differences in outcomes pose critical new research
questions that have not been adequately addressed. A better
understanding of when social initiatives adopted by corporations
are expected to have a “meaningful” impact on society is required,
as well as a better understanding of the role of social initiatives
within the larger societal debate over what corporate social
responsibility entails.
As a first step, we need to understand the predictors of social
initiative adoption by firms and also the factors that determine the
meaningfulness of the initiative. To develop an understanding of
what predicts a firm’s adoption of an initiative, we draw upon past
research grounded in institutional theory and resource dependency
theory, which considers the adoption of management practices and
organizational structures. To understand predictors of meaning-
fulness of a corporate social initiative, we consider the initiative’s
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alignment with firm competitiveness, firm values, and the use of
monitoring. Overall, our goal in this paper is to direct attention to
this issue of growing concern—that is, corporations using social
initiatives with limited societal impact to define themselves as
“socially responsible” and deflect pressures for greater changes. We
also hope to start a dialogue on what it means for a social initiative
to be “meaningful” and encourage future researchers to study factors
that lead to such initiatives. We begin this discussion by first
considering the broader question of the role of social initiatives in
the larger debate over the meaning of corporate social responsibility.
 
INSTITUTIONAL WARS AND THE ROLE OF 
SOCIAL INITIATIVES
 
In order to understand the larger context in which social initiatives
exist and their role in the “institutional war” over the meaning of
corporate social responsibility, we need to examine institutional
pressures more generally. Firms are embedded within a network of
relationships that place pressures on them to conform to certain
expectations. Over time, these expectations form the basis of rules
that “function as myths, which organizations incorporate, gaining
legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival prospects”
(Meyer and Rowan 1977: 340). Thus, institutional theorists argue
that these rules become taken for granted, and organizations
become more similar over time as they all conform to the same
rules. More recently, however, researchers have taken issue with
such “oversocialized” explanations (Ingram and Simons 1995) that
leave out the role of interest and agency (DiMaggio 1991; Powell
1991). Oliver (1991: 145) states, “Notably lacking . . . is explicit
attention to the strategic behaviors that organizations employ in
direct response to the institutional processes that affect them.” In
response, some researchers have attempted to find a balance
between the taken-for-granted aspect of institutions and the role of
interest and agency. These scholars do not view institutional pres-
sures as independent forces on firms, such as technical demands,
but as forces that set “the very conditions under which the agency
is able to influence the adoption of organizational structure and
practices” (Goodrick and Salancik 1996). Hoffman (1997, 2001),
for example, argues that institutional pressures operate as a
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constraining force by setting the boundaries of appropriate structures
and action, but recognizes that firms have freedom of choice within
those boundaries. Likewise, Goodrick and Salancik (1996) argue
that, “Organizational interests play a role in selecting practices, but
as an addition to the constraint provided by prevailing institutions
rather than as an alternative to them.” Thus, past research suggests
that firm practices are the product of institutional forces as well as
strategic behaviors that reflect organizational interests.
Organizational interests are most active in shaping practices
when there is uncertainty in the institutional forces, which reduces
their constraining power. Goodrick and Salancik (1996) argue that
there are three factors that create institutional uncertainty in the
environment. These factors show that there is significant institutional
uncertainty with respect to corporate social initiatives. First, there
is uncertainty when the institution possesses a goal, but the means
are unspecified. Social initiatives address corporate goals to “give
back to the community” or become “agents of positive social change,”
but the specific means of doing so are left to the firm. Second,
uncertainty exists when the knowledge base is limited. Currently,
there are attempts at, but no well-established method of, determining
the social impact of different community involvement activities.
While we identify certain criteria for a “meaningful” social initiative
in this paper, these criteria are far from “social fact” status. Finally,
institutional values may be uncertain. Although many applaud
active involvement in the community, their reasons can be based on
instrumental (i.e., profit-maximizing) or normative (i.e., ethically
appropriate) rationales, which can reflect significantly different
values. Others, however, think that community initiatives reflect
the wrong values and argue that, “Most [corporate social responsi-
bility], in fact, is probably delusional, meaning it reduces both
profits and social welfare” (The Economist 2005: 4).
Because there is significant uncertainty as to what social initiatives
corporations should adopt as well as the more general question of
what corporate social responsibility entails, organizations will have
significant influence in how they choose to satisfy those demands
(Edelman 1992; Goodrick and Salancik 1996). Based on the
strength of pressures from other actors in the field, organizations
will respond strategically to do their best to maximize both economic
benefits and legitimacy (Goodstein 1994; Oliver 1991). Firms do
this first by attempting to define social responsibility simply in
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terms of voluntary community involvement rather than focusing on
issues related to poor working conditions, unhealthy products, or
irresponsible marketing, for example (Shamir 2004, 2005). Corpo-
rations then tout the connection between good deeds and profitability
(“doing well by doing good”), thus “subjecting social considerations
to commercial ones” (Shamir 2004: 683). If successful, firms can
“managerialize” the concept of social responsibility in a way that
managerial conceptions of social responsibility displace competing
conceptions (see Edelman et al. 2001). Second, firms attempt to
define the meaning of voluntary community social initiatives.
Although some firms will make sincere efforts to improve societal
welfare, others may simply use social initiatives as symbolic devices
that play a role in the larger debate over social responsibility (see
Haley 1991).
Thus, not only do firms respond actively to institutional pressures
(as opposed to passively incorporating environmentally determined
norms), their actions also shape the development of institutions.
Recent work in institutional theory conceptualizes the development
of a field as a dynamic process, whereby new actors may join or
leave at different times and shift pressures (Hoffman 2001). Rather
than act as a single pressure on firms to adopt a social initiative,
“field level constituents engage in institutional war” (Hoffman 1999:
367) in which corporations play a central role. Corporations along
with a wide variety of other actors, including social investors, con-
sumers, nongovernmental organizations, academics, and consultants
engage in an active debate over the meaning of corporate social
initiatives and the values they should represent. These groups
constitute the organizational field that forms around the general
issue of social responsibility, as well as appropriate corporate
responses to particular problems in society.
In this institutional war, social initiatives play a significant role
in defining the meaning of corporate social responsibility. Shamir
(2004, 2005) argues that corporations—and nonprofit organizations
established to serve the needs of corporations—are attempting to
alter the discussion over corporate social responsibility by moving
it away from topics of conflict (e.g., labor rights) and toward an
exclusive focus on community investment initiatives. Through this
process, the concept of corporate social responsibility is becoming
transformed such that it is no longer a radical concept concerning
the responsibilities of corporations to society, but simply a tool for
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managing stakeholders and improving reputations. The idea of
corporations having mandatory duties enforced by the government
is replaced with corporations simply having voluntary duties to
assist and support government efforts in the community. In other
words, instead of community involvement being one of several
aspects that make up a firm’s entire social performance, corporations
are pushing for it to be the only aspect. In the end, “ ‘the community’
then becomes a commodity that can be sold to the world as proof of
responsible behavior on the side of the company” (Shamir 2004:
242–243 [quoting Kapelus]). As evidence of this shift, Shamir (2004,
2005) finds that conferences hosted to teach corporations about
socially responsible behavior typically avoid any serious discussion
of corporate wrongdoing and instead focus on the role of corporations
as agents of “social change.”
Thinking about the development of social initiatives through an
institutional lens thus requires recognizing that firms are an active
part in this ongoing process. Firms may respond to similar pressures
quite differently. Although responses may be limited by the institu-
tional field, the nature of the social initiatives will ultimately depend
on the firm’s perceptions of those institutional pressures and those
perceptions’ relationship to the firm’s potential competitiveness
benefits and identity as a “responsible” firm. Even in the face of
unambiguous pressures, firms will attempt to respond in a manner
that benefits organizational interests (Kelly 2003). As firms attempt
to interpret pressures and develop responses, these actions will
themselves determine what is an acceptable response (Edelman
1992). Therefore, firms have a significant stake in how they respond
to these pressures, both to protect their legitimacy in the short term
and to help define what it means to be a socially responsible firm
in the long term.
 
MEANINGFUL CORPORATE SOCIAL INITIATIVES
 
Firms can implement their version of social responsibility through
community involvement in a variety of ways. A firm’s choice of
involvement includes marketing-based activities (such as sponsor-
ships, cause-related marketing, and social marketing), employee
volunteering, alliances with nonprofit organizations, and adoption
of new business practices that support community initiatives
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(Andreasen and Drumwright 2001; Kotler and Lee 2005; Polonsky
and Wood 2001). These are not mutually exclusive categories,
and many firms engage in different types of initiatives simulta-
neously, as either independent initiatives or reinforcing ones
(Kotler and Lee 2005). As indicated earlier, there is a push for more
direct involvement of the corporation in the provision of the social




 This push comes not only from
stakeholders in the community, but also from corporations in
their attempt to define what it means to be socially responsible. For
example, the following is a summary of a seminar given by a typical
speaker at a conference held to teach corporations about social
responsibility:
[The speaker] offered the audience a conceptual scheme that
explains the move from charity to CSR and provides the
necessary language and tools. From monetary contribution
to community involvement. From ad-hoc action to thematic
action. From exercising charity to exercising change. From
paternalism to partnership. From cash to resources. From
marginal corporate action to central corporate action. From imper-
sonal to personal involvement. From image only to multiple
exposure. From “how much money to give” to impact
assessment. From static to dynamic orientation. All this is
necessary, he said, because CSR is a global corporate trend,
because corporations have to fill the gaps left by retreating
governments, and because it serves direct business interests.
Shamir (2005: 243)
For purposes of this paper, we define a social initiative as a program
that seeks to match the rhetoric of the speaker in the above quote
from Shamir (2005). That is, a social initiative moves beyond cash
contributions and involves direct involvement of the corporation.
Shamir (2005) is skeptical and suggests that the real goal of
seminars such as the one summarized above is to play a role in a
larger strategy of watering down the meaning of corporate social
responsibility. On the other hand, such initiative can in fact attend
to social welfare in an effective, meaningful way (Dunfee and Hess
2000). Thus, the challenge is to determine when corporations will
adopt meaningful initiatives. Below, we provide the beginnings of
a discussion on the characteristics that make corporate social
initiatives more likely to be meaningful.
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Meaningful vs. Symbolic Social Initiatives
 
Any new strategy or structure adopted due to external pressures
typically causes concerns over decoupling (Davis 2005). Under
institutional theory, the diffusion of strategies and structures can
include significantly different modes of adoption, ranging from
symbolic acts to fanatical converts (Davis 2005). Even firms acting
in good faith and adopting identical social initiatives may have
significantly different impacts on society based on the amount of
resources devoted to the project and its integration with the firm’s
strategy and culture (Howard-Grenville and Hoffman 2003; Nash
and Ehrenfeld 2001). Other firms simply may not act in good faith
when implementing a social initiative. An intentional failure to
follow through with a social initiative (i.e., adopt a symbolic
initiative) is consistent with the concerns mentioned earlier, that
firms are involved in socially responsible activities only for public
relations purposes and without any real concern for the impact of
an initiative on those it is designed to help. Just as firms may tout
the environmentally friendly aspects of their operations in order to
“greenwash” the significantly worse nonenvironmentally friendly
aspects of the majority of their operations (Tokar 1997), firms may
use superficial social initiatives as a way to improve their reputation
and sustain their legitimacy without any real concern for the ability
of the philanthropic activity to meet society’s needs.
Of course, a symbolic initiative may still provide some benefits
to society. The “meaningfulness” of a social initiative, however,
depends on its efficiency and effectiveness in meeting the needs of
society. Society expects corporations to adopt social initiatives
that actually benefit society, rather than adopting social initiatives
that provide the most benefits to the firm. For example, many
pharmaceutical companies had social initiatives that involved
donating drugs to developing countries, but these drugs were fre-
quently past their expiration date. In fact, this problem was so
widespread that the World Health Organization had to issue
guidelines to prevent such “dumping” (Joshi and Sanger 2005).
These expired drugs may not be harmful to the user, but at a
minimum they are less effective and in some cases may prevent the
intended beneficiary from receiving more helpful medicines. Thus,
such a social initiative only has limited effectiveness, at best, in
meeting the needs of society, but it may still provide significant
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benefits to the firm in terms of goodwill from stakeholders unaware
of the “dumping” nature of the donations.
Reflecting the concerns of corporate critics, we can place social
initiatives on a continuum ranging from those that provide significant
benefits to society to those that have no beneficial impact, and, in
some cases, to those that may harm society. An example from the
positive end of the spectrum would be Timberland’s involvement
with City Year, a nonprofit organization focused on community
service projects. Timberland provided significant resources and
numerous paid volunteer hours to City Year projects, even during
an economic downturn for the company (Austin 2000). Activities in
the center of the continuum that have no beneficial impact on
society, but may still provide a benefit to the company, including
shipments of antismoking drugs, lip balm, and cough syrup from
U.S. companies to refugees in Kosovo (Abelson 1999). In some
cases, though, these donations actually may have a negative impact
on society since not only were one-third to one-half of the shipments of




 its limited resources
to destroy the items (Abelson 1999).
At the extreme negative end of the continuum, tobacco company
activities illustrate the more manipulative, symbolic social initiatives.
When communities sought support for educational programs on
the dangers of teen smoking and called for the removal of tobacco
ads directed at young people, Philip Morris announced a $100 million
“Think. Don’t smoke” campaign. This campaign involved many
different projects, including the development and distribution of
textbook covers for teens that conveyed the campaign’s message
(Davidson and Novelli 2001; Farrelly et al. 2002; Landman et al.
2002; McQueen 2001). Philip Morris benefited from this initiative
by reducing the likelihood of government regulation of tobacco
advertising. Their sincerity, however, was challenged by those who
claimed Philip Morris continued advertising its products directly
to that very same age group. In addition, survey research on teen
attitudes indicated that the “Think. Don’t Smoke” advertisements
actually improved attitudes toward smoking (Farrelly et al. 2002).
Thus, if the campaign is not effective in reducing teen smoking or,
in this case, increases the likelihood of smoking, society is harmed
by the company’s social initiative.
One goal of this paper, then, is to begin a discussion on what
attributes are key indicators that a social initiative is (or has the
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potential to be) meaningful, as opposed to symbolic. Building upon
the public affairs literature and research on ethics and environmental
initiatives, we assert that meaningful initiatives are likely to require




Drawing on the public affairs literature on political









 (Hillman and Hitt 1999). Under a transactional
approach, the firm may initiate and terminate philanthropic activity
based on the fluctuation of pressures that it is facing from different
sources. AT&T, for example, regularly made donations to Planned
Parenthood until pro-life groups protested, and then the company
immediately stopped (Hess et al. 2002). Cash donations, such as
those given by AT&T, can be easily shifted based on pressures
facing the firm. Although cash donations can clearly benefit society,
critics suggest that they can be “narrow, self-serving, and often
motivated to improve the corporation’s reputation” (Pearce and Doh
2005: 32). This causes unfocused corporate giving that is not an
effective use of resources to address societal problems. Porter and
Kramer (2002) go so far as to state that, based on current practices,
Milton Friedman was right in stating that corporations should pass
these funds on to shareholders and let them decide how to distribute
the money.
Under a relational approach, by contrast, the firm is committed
to a project and works to establish long-term relationships with
important stakeholder groups. Thus, the relational approach
reflects a more stable, long-term commitment to philanthropy, which
through organizational learning, resource sharing, and other
mechanisms should be more likely to have a meaningful impact on
society (Austin 2000; Pearce and Doh 2005). This distinction
between transactional and relational approaches reflects the views
of corporate social responsibility advocates who assert that corporate
social responsibility must be a part of the firm’s strategy and not
simply an “add-on” (Hollender and Fenichell 2004; O’Reilly 2004).
Building on the distinction between transactional and relational
initiatives, we believe that meaningful social initiatives are more
likely to result from relational forms of philanthropy that involve a
substantial commitment of firm resources over time. At the other
end of the spectrum are transactions such as simple cash donations
or short-term collaboration such as sponsorship for a single event.
 




A second key indicator of meaningful social
initiatives is the use of the firm’s strategic resources in the initiative,
and often with a direct connection to the firm’s core competencies
(Hess et al. 2002; Pearce and Doh 2005; Porter and Kramer 2006).
As stated by Pearce and Doh (2005: 34): “Companies maximize the
benefits of their corporate contributions when they leverage core
capabilities and contribute product and services that are based on
expertise used in, or generated by, their normal operations.” Examples
include IBM’s use of its technology to help schools assess student
progress (Hess et al. 2002) and McKinsey & Co. providing free
consulting services to nonprofit educational and cultural organiza-
tions (Bruch and Walter 2005). If the firm’s resources are rare, the
firm becomes one of only a few that can provide that service to the
community (Dunfee and Hess 2000). In this way, the firm would be
meeting a need of the community that otherwise would likely go
unmet. Dunfee (2006: 186) goes so far as to argue that “firms
possessing a unique human catastrophe rescue competency have a
moral obligation to devote substantial resources toward best
efforts to aid the victims.” An example would be pharmaceutical
companies having a moral obligation to provide aid to AIDS victims
in Africa (Dunfee 2006).
Relational commitment and use of the firm’s key resources
reflect the need for the social initiative to be integrated with the
firm’s operations and operating ethos. Similar to ethics programs
(Trevino et al. 1999) or environmental programs (Nash and Ehrenfeld
2001), the more the social initiative is integrated into firm practices,
the more likely it is to be successful (in terms of impact on society)
and sustainable over time. In the next section, we turn to the
question of when a corporation would adopt such an initiative. We
begin by presenting theory on the institutional forces that lead
to adoption of both meaningful and symbolic corporate social
initiatives and then continue with a more refined discussion of
factors that lead to the adoption of meaningful, rather than symbolic,
social initiatives.
 
ADOPTION OF SOCIAL INITIATIVES
 
To briefly summarize, corporations commonly adopt social initiatives
as a way to reduce pressures on the firm to be socially responsible.
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In addition, these actions not only serve to reduce immediate
pressures placed on the firm, but, at the organizational field level,
play a role in shaping what it means for a corporation to be socially
responsible and thereby influences the intensity and nature of the
pressures placed on firms. To the extent that these social initiatives
are not “meaningful” in their potential for an efficient and effective
positive impact on society, then corporations maintain or gain their
legitimacy without providing a real benefit to society. As a first step
in attempting to understand when a corporation may adopt a
meaningful social initiative, we look more closely at the initial
motivation to adopt a social initiative.
 
Why Do Corporations Adopt Social Initiatives?
 
From a stakeholder theory perspective, firms are responsive to
society’s expectations of responsible conduct based on either a
normative justification or a business rationale (Donaldson and
Preston 1995; Smith 2003). The normative justification is based on
the claim that firms not only have an obligation to minimize any
harm they cause society, but also a duty to use their capabilities
to effect positive social change. The business, or instrumental,
rationale relies on “enlightened self-interest” in which firms believe
that being socially responsible will lead to improved financial per-
formance (Bowie 1991; Donaldson and Preston 1995). The potential
business benefits from being involved with the community through
social initiatives include an improved reputation, increased access
to markets, improved corporate culture, improved recruiting of
employees, and boundary spanning functions (Hess et al. 2002;
Wild 1993; Zadek 2000). This is an extension of the basic idea of
strategic philanthropy, where firms recognized that an appropriately
planned giving strategy could advance their marketing strategy in
ways that traditional marketing methods could not (Smith 1994).
From an institutional theory perspective, on the other hand, firms
would adopt a social initiative to gain legitimacy with external
stakeholders (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
Insights from resource dependence theory for institutional theory
provide guidance in understanding why firms respond differently to
institutional pressures—a question increasingly raised by institutional
theorists (see Friedland and Alford 1991; Greenwood and Hinings
1996; Lounsbury 2001; Powell 1991), as discussed earlier. The
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approach developed here sees the development of social initiatives
as a complex, ongoing process where corporations’ actions respond
to institutional pressures but also have an impact on the nature
and intensity of the pressures they face. In addition, due to the
normative moral underpinnings of many social initiatives, an
organization’s response to societal pressures also will depend on
its perception of its own image and identity.
 
Understanding Strategic Responses to Institutional 
Pressures
 
Oliver (1991) developed a framework that identified five strategic
responses to institutional pressures. In order from least active to
most active response, these strategies are: acquiescence, compromise,
avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. Acquiescence is the most
passive response and involves the firm giving in to the external
pressures. Manipulation, on the other hand, is the most active
response and involves attempts to influence the content and nature
of the pressures or assert control over those applying the pressure.
The strategy a firm employs depends on the nature of the institu-
tional pressures, which Oliver (1991) proposes is determined by five
factors: cause, constituents, content, control, and context. For
example, a firm will acquiesce when the external pressures are for
the adoption of practices that support economic efficiency, the firm
is dependent on the constituent applying the pressure, there is
widespread adoption of the practice, and adoption would impose
few discretionary constraints on the firm. When the factors are
the opposite, however, a firm will implement a manipulation strategy
(Oliver 1991).
Oliver’s framework, although comprehensive and highly informa-
tive, is limited in its ability to predict the meaningfulness of a social
initiative. Although a firm may adopt a social initiative—either
through a strategy of acquiescence, compromise, or avoidance (e.g.,
a ceremonial adoption)—the implementation of that program is
what has the potential to make it meaningful. Unlike other studies
on the diffusion of practices or structures that focus only on
whether or not a firm adopted the innovation (see, e.g., Westphal
and Zajac 1994, 1998, 2001; Zajac and Westphal 1995), the adop-
tion of a meaningful social initiative is significantly more complex
and includes many factors. The study of social initiatives is more
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similar to studies on total quality management, for example, that
recognize firms can customize those practices to meet their needs
(Westphal et al. 1997).
Thus, even a program adopted under a strategy of acquiescence
may not become meaningful if the extra effort needed for implemen-
tation beyond adoption is not taken. For example, Oliver argues
that high diffusion of the practice throughout the field will lead to
acquiesce or compromise, rather than use of an avoidance strategy
(including symbolic compliance). By contrast, Milstein and colleagues
(2002) would argue that Oliver’s institutional factor of diffusion
would lead to superficial symbolic responses by firms, since firms
may not have the necessary resources to carry out the strategy
effectively or will see no economic benefit from adopting a strategy
that is widespread within the industry and therefore will not expend
the effort to ensure it is implemented properly.
To further explore the possibility of a firm adopting a meaningful
social initiative, we first consider the decision to adopt and then to
work toward a meaningful social initiative. To do this, we draw from
the insights of Oliver’s framework, as well as other studies using
institutional theory and resource dependence theory (Barringer
and Milkovich 1998; Greening and Gray 1994) and then combine
them with the additional motivations based on competitiveness
reasons and a sense of responsibility.
 
Firms’ Ability to Resist Institutional Pressures
 
A firm’s ability to resist institutional pressures will depend upon
the nature and source of the pressure. Here we consider those
pressures most likely to influence the adoption of a corporate social
initiative. The first set of factors draws from institutional theory.
Since our concern is with firms’ strategic response to these forces,
our focus is on coercive and normative pressures. The next set of




Coercive forces pressuring firms
into adopting social initiatives come from a variety of sources, and
they may be specific to a firm or affect all firms in the industry.
When most people think of coercive pressures in the domain of
social responsibility, they think of special-interest groups (Greening
and Gray 1994). These groups may push for new regulations on
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firms, but more often they use nonlegal sanctions, such as boycotts
or negative publicity, to push their agenda. Although the empirical
evidence on the financial impact of NGO tactics—such as boycotts—
on the targeted firms is mixed, firms do actively respond to such
pressures (Spar and La Mure 2003). Of course, one way they may
respond is to attempt to divert attention from the contentious issue
raised by the NGO by engaging in community investment (Christian
Aid 2004; see also Shamir 2004, 2005).
Although all firms in an industry may face the same issue, some
firms are more likely targets of NGO pressure than others. Most
may expect that NGOs will target the worst offenders or least
socially responsible firms in that industry, but recent research
is suggesting the opposite. NGOs may target firms that view
themselves as socially responsible under the belief that those firms
may be more responsive to their pressures.
Legal and regulatory issues also create coercive pressures.
Firms do not generally face legal requirements to engage in social
initiatives, but such initiatives may be an effective tool to stave off
regulation in related areas. For example, in 2002, lawsuits against
fast-food restaurants increased public scrutiny of that industry, as
well the packaged foods industry, which feared they would be the
next targets. In response, some firms in these industries undertook
social initiatives of providing exercise equipment to elementary
schools (Branch 2002). Food industry firms adopted these pro-
grams in an attempt to demonstrate their concern for children’s
health and to demonstrate that additional regulation of their behavior
to protect the health of children was unnecessary. Similarly, as
described above, tobacco companies instituted social initiatives to
avoid government regulation related to marketing and sale of
cigarettes to minors (Davidson and Novelli 2001). If the firm does
not conform to these external demands, then it may face severe
consequences through intrusive legislation or lawsuits. Thus, when
the threat of additional regulation is high, firms will be more likely
to adopt a social initiative related to the topic of the legal threat (see
Oliver 1991).
An indirect coercive factor involves a crisis event (Greening
and Gray 1994). Such an event is an indirect factor because it
works by strengthening the power, or targeting the focus, of govern-
ment and special-interest groups. Firms that are facing a crisis or
belong to industries facing crises may exhibit greater sensitivity to
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institutional pressures to adopt a social initiative (see King and
Lenox 2000). Certain industries, such as tobacco, constantly
receive public scrutiny due to the harm caused by their products.
Other industries face greater scrutiny during times around isolated
events, such as industrial accidents. For example, firms are
currently facing increased pressures to disclose information
on nonfinancial matters, such as their environmental impact.
Although most firms are resisting this pressure, firms facing a crisis
event, such as an oil spill in their industry or a regulatory action,
respond by providing greater disclosure on that matter (although it
is overwhelmingly positive information) (Adams 2002; Berthelot
et al. 2003; Deegan 2002; Deegan and Rankin 1996; Deegan et al.
2000).
Because a firm’s social initiative plays a role in the larger debate
on social responsibility, a crisis may even lead to a social initiative
on an unrelated matter. Such a social initiative allows the firm to
“acquire” an audience and attempt to create favorable societal
perceptions (Haley 1991). It is even possible that firms would adopt
a social initiative preemptively, as insurance (or a “safety net”)
against reputation damage from a potential future crisis or scandal
(Fombrun et al. 2000).
Larger firms are particularly sensitive to the above pressures.
These firms face greater attention from government bodies and the
media and are more vulnerable to these pressures than smaller
firms (Goodstein 1994; Powell 1991). Due to this visibility and
attention, large firms must take actions to protect their legitimacy.
This is consistent with research showing that a key determinant of
the amount of corporate charitable giving is firm size (Adams and
Hardwick 1998; Boatsman and Gupta 1996; Buchholtz et al. 1999;




Normative pressures refer to a
general understanding of what is the “right” way to act, as deter-
mined by professional standards, for example. Such pressure can
build through the diffusion of practices throughout the firm’s
institutional field (Oliver 1991). For example, it is arguable that
Merck’s decisions with respect to the development and free distribution
of a new drug to combat river blindness in developing countries
led to the initiatives of Pfizer and SmithKline Beecham to develop
philanthropic programs to fight trachoma and lymphatic filariasis,
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respectively, in developing countries (Hess et al. 2002). Merck adopted
one of the first large-scale drug donation programs, and then
other firms felt pressured to follow Merck’s behavior such that drug
donation programs are developing into a norm within the pharma-
ceutical industry. As more firms adopt these programs, their
validity becomes established and their use unquestioned (Oliver
1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977). If a firm does not follow the established
norm, then it may face challenges to its social legitimacy. For example,
after the September 11th tragedy, the public had negative reactions
to firms they believed (wrongly in some cases) were not following an
established norm of providing aid in such situations, and viewed
such firms as “not supporting America” (Alsop 2002: B1).
In addition to the number of other firms adopting an initiative,
the relationship between the firm and other organizations in the
field also should affect adoption (Oliver 1991). The stronger the
relationships and dependencies a firm has with those in its field,
the more likely “best practices” and shared understandings are to
be transferred among firms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). One
important way this can occur is through membership in organiza-
tions that purport to promote socially responsible behavior, such as
those studied by Shamir (2004, 2005). These connections are espe-
cially important in the area of philanthropic activity. Galaskiewicz
(1997), for example, found that CEO and director network ties
influenced firms’ charitable giving practices. The more embedded
company officials were in the elite networks, the more their com-




The nature and source of pres-
sures on firms to engage in social initiatives affects the ability of a
firm to resist. At many times the expectations of different stake-
holders with respect to social initiatives are in conflict (Oliver 1991),
and a firm cannot meet one demand without an action that conflicts
with another constituent’s demand. Proponents of stakeholder
management often struggle with the issue of how to prioritize and
weigh these different demands (Berman et al. 1999; Mitchell et al.
1997; Russo and Fouts 1997). Consistent with the resource-
dependence theory, Mitchell and colleagues (1997) argue that
managers must pay the most attention to those stakeholder groups
that have legitimacy and power (and especially those with the
additional attribute of urgency).
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Under the resource-dependence theory, the firm’s dependence
on the constituent making the demand is expected to be a predictor
of the firm’s responsiveness to those demands (Oliver 1991). In the
face of demands from important constituents, firms will find it
difficult to resist those demands. For example, when oil and gas
companies expand drilling operations into developing countries,
they often face requests from community groups to provide local
assistance with education and health care. Firms readily give into
these demands in order to avoid resistance from community groups
as well as human rights groups, both of which can severely hamper
a firm’s operations in that country (Hess et al. 2002). Similarly,
firms that depend more heavily on female workers and female
managers are more likely to adopt work–family programs (Goodstein
1994; Ingram and Simons 1995). Likewise, firms that rely on social
investors or socially responsible consumers may be more likely to
adopt high-visibility social initiatives.
At this point, we have described the pressures and demands
affecting the adoption of corporate social initiatives but said little
about the degree to which the adopted initiatives will be meaningful
or symbolic. In the next section, we consider which factors improve









Institutional theory and resource dependence theory provide us with
significant theoretical insights and empirical evidence on when firms
may adopt social initiatives, and why they may focus their efforts on
one social issue rather than another. However, less is known about
the likelihood of adopting a social initiative that is expected to be
meaningful. For example, with respect to compliance programs,
Trevino and colleagues (1999) found that membership in a professional
organization made it more likely that a firm would adopt a compliance
program, but that the features of the program the firm adopted were
those that could be easily decoupled from actual operations, as opposed
to those that had to be integrated with operations. To determine the
potential for meaningfulness after adoption, we focus on the poten-
tial for the initiative to provide the firm with competitive benefits,
the firm’s core values, and monitoring by external bodies.
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As a brief aside before beginning that discussion, it is important
to note that the adoption of social initiatives should be viewed as a
process, which requires that we see the choices a firm makes as
path dependent. For example, when adopting a social initiative, the
organization could give control over it to a social responsibility
department, a corporate foundation, the marketing/public relations
department, or keep it with central administration (Brammer and
Millington 2003). Where the firm allocates control of the initiative
will have a significant effect on its implementation (Brammer and
Millington 2003) and potential to have a meaningful outcome. In a
study of recycling programs at colleges and universities, Lounsbury
(2001) found significant differences in the implementation of a
program based on whether management of the program was given
to a facilities director as an additional responsibility (role accretion)
or if a new, full-time position was created to manage the program
(status creation). Under role accretion, program managers contin-
ued to identify with their traditional role and put little effort into the
program compared to a full-time manager. On the other hand, the
full-time managers developed new occupational identities based on
their position, which led to them putting more effort into expanding
the programs, attempting to measure effectiveness, and overall
working toward meeting the ideals of the environmental movement
(Lounsbury 2001). Furthermore, these managers often had a
connection with a professional organization in the field, which
influenced their programs. Thus, the firm’s initial response will
have an impact on how future institutional pressures are perceived
and acted upon within the organization. These internal groups in
control of the initiative moderate the institutional pressures the
firm faces by determining their importance.
 
Alignment with Competitive Benefits
 
Institutional theory treats a firm’s social environment as distinct
from its technical environment for the purpose of analysis, even
if it is recognized that these two environments are inextricably
intertwined (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott and Meyer 1983). In
their analyses of work–family programs, Goodstein (1994) and
Ingram and Simons (1995) both recognized that managers weigh
institutional pressures against the perceived technical outcomes of
being responsive to those demands. Those firms that are motivated
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by a focus on technical outcomes will pay attention to the costs and
benefits of the initiative to the firm. When deciding whether and
how to implement an initiative, management will likely phrase their
interests in terms of the return on this “investment,” the expected
reaction of the marketplace, and the effect on share value, rather
than the expected impact on the community (Bansal and Roth
2000). The impact on societal well-being may only enter into man-
agement’s strategic calculus if a meaningful initiative is expected
to create greater benefits for the firm, such as through increased
goodwill. In many ways, the societal benefits are simply a positive
externality of a strictly financially oriented decision.
In other cases, when the public and private benefits are aligned,
firms will adopt a meaningful initiative. For example, Rosen and
colleagues (2003) argue that most multinational firms operating in
developing countries have an AIDS problem in their workforce and
that by taking steps to address this problem firms will save lives
and money. The authors claim that globalization is built on cheap
labor and emerging markets for MNC’s products, but both are being
threatened by the spread of AIDS. Because AIDS commonly affects
workers in their most productive years, businesses lose their cost
advantages from cheap labor by having to continually train new
workers. In recognition of this reality, some firms are forced into
taking the extreme step of hiring two or three new workers for every
job opening (Rosen et al. 2003). To fight the numerous direct and
indirect costs of AIDS in the workforce, firms must work toward
treatment, as well as prevention in the broader community. Using
six companies of various sizes operating in southern Africa as
examples, Rosen and colleagues (2003) show that each firm could
reduce operating costs by implementing an effective AIDS program.
Thus, firms with workforces affected by AIDS are more likely to
adopt a meaningful social initiative because the pressure is
augmented by the business concerns of the firm.
Firms also must decide how integrated the program should be
with its corporate strategy and culture. A corporation could simply
adopt an off-the-shelf, generic social initiative based on that used
by other firms or recommended by a stakeholder group. In this way,
they will simply mimic what others are doing. If the firm does not
view the proposed initiative as potentially providing contributions
to the bottom line, it is more likely to take this route and adopt a
widely used, generic strategy as a symbolic response to institutional
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pressures (Milstein et al. 2002). On the other hand, if the firm per-
ceives the initiative as potentially contributing competitiveness
benefits, then it will undertake efforts to match the initiative
with its resources in order to take full advantage of its potential
organizational benefits (Milstein et al. 2002). Thus, the corporation
may work toward developing an initiative that takes advantage of its
resources and is integrated with the firm’s culture, both of which
may lead to a more sustainable and meaningful social initiative.
 
Alignment with the Firm’s Core Values
 
The normative rationale for corporate social responsibility, and
specifically social initiatives, relies on giving back to the community
out of a sense of responsibility and a desire to do good works. Based
initially on a Kantian theory of ethics and a need to take into
consideration the rights of those impacted by corporate decisions
(Evan and Freeman 1983), stakeholder theory has become a
leading theory of business ethics. Other moral theories, such as
social contracts, also have been proposed to provide the normative
core of stakeholder management (Donaldson and Dunfee 1994,
1999). All, however, recognize that managers have certain moral
obligations that they cannot simply cast aside in the face of
conflicting strategic imperatives (Berman et al. 1999). Whereas
institutional pressures may lead firms to simply acquiesce, firms
with core values that favor social initiatives may work toward
proactively exceeding those expectations.
In recent research by Bansal and Roth (2000) on why firms adopt
ecologically responsive practices, the authors found that firms go
“green” based on one of three motivations: ecological responsibility,
competitiveness, or legitimization. In their study, managers
adopting environmentally responsible practices based on a sense of
responsibility stated, “We’ve always recognized that the feel-good
factor is important” and “There is nothing wrong with doing good”
(Bansal and Roth 2000: 725). Other managers stated, “We are
talking about insurance” (legitimization) or “If environmental
issues . . . put money in the till, then it will become a primary
consideration” (competitiveness) (Bansal and Roth 2000: 725).
Consistent with the findings of Bansal and Roth (2000), some
firms may view responding to societal needs with social initiatives
as part of their moral obligations. Unlike other types of structures
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or practices adopted by firms and explained through an institutional
theory perspective, social initiatives go to the core meaning of the
firm; that is, do firms serve societal needs by simply enhancing
shareholder value or do they have broader obligations to work for
the betterment of society? In other words, social initiatives say
something about the moral values of the organization and its
members.
Accordingly, a firm’s identity and image should have a significant
impact on its willingness to adopt a social initiative and the mean-
ingfulness of the initiative adopted. Elsbach and Kramer (1996:
442) state that, “An organization’s identity reflects its central and
distinguishing attributes, including its core values, organizational
culture, modes of performance, and products.” For example, a firm
with an identity and image of being socially responsible is likely to
face dissonance if it receives feedback that it is not doing enough for
the community (see Elsbach and Kramer 1996; Gioa et al. 2000).
Although some firms may then attempt to adopt changes to adjust
their identity (Elsbach and Kramer 1996), others firms with an
image of being socially responsible may respond differently. For
example, Fox-Wolfgramm and colleagues (1998) studied banks’
responses to the Community Reinvestment Act, which was a
response to discrimination in lending practices. The Act required
banks to meet the credit needs of the communities they serve
through lending practices, as well as involvement in community
development projects. Some firms, which were in actuality not
meeting the requirements of the Act, believed they were meeting the
requirements based on their identity. Thus, these firms resisted
institutional pressures for change—which the authors labeled
“virtuous resistance”—believing that those pressures did not apply
to them. It was only when there was clear and unambiguous evi-
dence of noncompliance with the Act that the firm adopted changes
in its practices (Fox-Wolfgramm et al. 1998).
Other firms that do not have an identity of being socially
responsible may resist change. In the Fox-Wolfgramm et al. study
(1998), the bank that did not view the demands of the Act as part of
its identity and image did give in to coercive pressures to meet those
demands, but it did not adopt practices that would continue to
meet those demands in the future. Once the pressures subsided,
the firm returned to its old practices because it did not also change
its identity. Thus, for firms that do not have an identity of social
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responsibility, we might expect them to adopt a symbolic social
initiative and then withdraw support for that initiative once
pressure subsides. Firms that also have changed their identity to
coincide with the institutional pressures, however, may adopt more
sustainable social initiatives.
A firm does not need to have an identity related to corporate
social responsibility in order for identity and image to affect the
implementation of a social initiative. For example, ignoring insti-
tutional pressures relating to an important social need may
conflict with the organization’s identity and image as a high-quality
organization. In their study of the Port Authority of New York, Dutton
and Dukerich (1991) found that the organization’s identity affected
its selection of strategies to solve issues related to homelessness,
and that subsequent changes in the Port Authority’s image caused
concern for employees who found that image in conflict with their
personal identities. Overall, the core values of the firm (i.e., its
normative orientation) influences the way the firm responds to
the institutional pressures such that the firm has a greater desire to
be responsive through the adoption of a meaningful social initiative
if its core values align with the pressure.
 
The Role of Monitoring
 
The meaningfulness of a social initiative is not determined simply at
adoption, but through its implementation. Much like the use of
monitoring in the implementation of codes of conduct (Sethi 2003b),
monitoring of social initiatives can provide valuable information
regarding the effectiveness of current programs. We assert that
monitoring will positively affect initiatives adopted by both firms
that strive for social impact and those that hope to stave off
stakeholder pressures. Although a firm may wish to adopt a
symbolic social initiative, the presence of capable constituent groups
to monitor the performance and implementation of a firm’s social
initiative may force the firm to increase its efficiency and effectiveness
in meeting the needs of society (see D’Aunno et al. 1991; King and
Lenox 2000). Organizations that use decoupling to satisfy external
demands attempt to restrict the ability of constituent groups to
monitor their performance (Meyer and Rowan 1977) and this will
lead to less efficient and effective social initiatives. To some extent,
the ability of constituents to monitor performance depends on the
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visibility of (or ability to measure) the outcome of the social initiative
and the proximity of the constituent group to the initiative. For
example, even if pressures for a social initiative come from an NGO
with legitimacy and significant normative powers (Mitchell et al.
1997), the firm may still be able to adopt a symbolic social initiative
if it is not possible to monitor performance in terms of social welfare
outcomes, or at least the commitment and use of resources of the
firm. If the initiative includes significant involvement from an NGO,
however, then the NGO should have greater monitoring ability due
to its proximity and be able to ensure that the initiative is meaningful
(see Austin 2000).
The importance of monitoring to the meaningfulness of a social
initiative is best realized by considering the earlier examples of
product donations to those in need. For instance, victims of the
recent tsunami in Southeast Asia received an outpouring of donations
that included obviously useless products such as evening dresses
and ski jackets, as well as seemingly more thoughtful contributions
such as bottled water (Barta and Bellman 2005). The organizations
receiving the donations, however, wished they had a means for
communicating with donors because even the bottled water (which
is expensive to transport) was not needed once the water supply
facilities were returned to normal (Barta and Bellman 2005). Had
the recipients or NGOs played a role in monitoring the initiatives
and possessed the ability to provide feedback, then the likelihood of
even well-intentioned but useless donations would be lower. For
corporations’ donations of pharmaceuticals, the World Health
Organization (WHO) serves this monitoring role (Chase and Barta
2005; Joshi and Sanger 2005). Donations of drugs to those in need
are now more likely to be meaningful because the WHO promulgated
guidelines that require companies to send only drugs that were
actually requested by aid groups, that all drugs have an expiration
date of at least 12 months away, and that the containers are labeled
in a manner suitable for local users (Chase and Barta 2005).
Much like firms that seek feedback on their business practices
(Sethi 2003b), some corporations voluntarily seek feedback on
social initiatives from the community (Austin 2000). An organization
that possesses a means for feedback and adjusts its programs
based on that information displays a relational commitment to
corporate social initiatives. Furthermore, the feedback system,
combined with constituent oversight, increases the likelihood that
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the initiative is meeting a social need. In general, the ability to
monitor increases a constituent group’s power and prior research
has found that powerful groups can prevent symbolic responses




Any social initiative—whether meaningful or symbolic—contributes
to shaping the issue of corporate social responsibility in the
institutional field. As argued by Shamir (2005) and others, however,
overemphasis on social initiatives pushes the debate over social
responsibility away from issues of conflict with stakeholders and
toward issues of voluntary charitable acts. This is especially
problematic if corporate social initiatives provide little true value to
society. Thus, we need to be cognizant of the role that social initia-
tives play in this debate, both positively (corporations providing aid
that perhaps only they can provide and therefore should be part of
their responsibilities to society (see Dunfee 2006)) and negatively
(creating a distraction from other issues related to social responsibility).
Clearly, a meaningful social initiative is more beneficial to social
welfare than a symbolic one. However, even a symbolic initiative
can have a beneficial impact. Because the “institutional war” around
corporate social responsibility involves issues of power relations
(Howard-Grenville 2002), certain stakeholders may attain power by
being able to point to a hypocritical social initiative. In other words,
rather than staving off pressures, a symbolic social initiative can
open the door for stakeholders to put even greater pressures on
firms. For example, in the early 1990s, Monsanto made specific
commitments to improving its environmental performance and
apparently made good faith efforts at achieving those goals (Sastry
et al. 2002). Once Monsanto realized it could not attain those goals,
however, it attempted to change its approach by simply using the
rhetoric of sustainability and not committing to specific operational
changes (Sastry et al. 2002). Monsanto soon found that it could not
easily shift to a decoupling strategy and faced problems from
stakeholders seeking to hold the company to its earlier commit-
ments. The Monsanto case displays the value in viewing the pressures
to adopt social initiatives as a process because, in some cases,
symbolic adoption may reduce institutional pressures and in
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others, it creates opportunities for greater pressures to be placed
on the firm.
Understanding social initiatives and their potential for meaning-
fulness also requires that we look inside the corporation. For example,
the firm’s identity has an impact on how the organization’s
members interpret the importance of an issue raised by constituents,
and whether or not it is viewed as an issue with moral content
(Dutton and Dukerich 1991). This has an impact on what the firm
views as the “success stories” from other organizations that it
should follow as best practices. These success stories and their
transferability to other organizations are “cultural constructions,
formulated in terms of the problems that actors perceive and modes
of action they find comprehensible” (Strang and Macy 2001: 179).
For example, pressures from consumers may cause the firm to
frame the issue in terms of market demand for products embodied
with socially responsible features (Hoffman 2001; McWilliams and
Siegel 2001). Pressures from investors, on the other hand, are
framed in terms of capital acquisition or risk management (Hoff-
man 2001). These distinctions in the way the firm conceptualizes
stakeholder pressures will affect the firm’s perceptions of the
institutional field and its view of acceptable responses.
Overall, there are significant pressures on firms to develop social
initiatives with the potential to cause real social change. Building
on Oliver’s (1991) theory which combines institutional and resource
dependence perspectives, we argue that firms are not passive
actors in their institutional environment but strategically respond
to institutional pressures based on the nature of those pressures.
We predict that the adoption of social initiatives and their potential
to provide meaningful improvements to social welfare is a function
of institutional pressures, perceived competitiveness benefits, and
the firm’s core values. In addition, monitoring by constituents is
expected to play a key role in ensuring the meaningfulness of an
initiative. This is an ongoing process, however, and the firm’s
response to pressures will guide its future actions as well as
contribute to shaping the institutional field.
Future researchers should continue the theoretical and empirical
development of our understanding of corporate social initiative
along the path laid out here. This requires further development of
what is a “meaningful” social initiative, and which factors make a
social initiative more likely to be meaningful. A meaningful social
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initiative can result from any motivation of the firm—moral
responsibility, competitiveness, or legitimization—and we need a
better understanding of what factors influence the process from
adoption to implementation, regardless of the firm’s initial motiva-
tion. In addition, we need a better understanding of the role of social
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